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Constitutional Caution
Cass R. Sunsteint
I. GOVERNMENT FAILURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL FALURE
Begin with a platitude: When government attempts to regu-
late the market, many things may go wrong. In the familiar
litany, regulation may be counterproductive, producing outcomes
that defeat the aspirations of well-meaning reformers. Or, regula-
tion may be futile, as the market adapts to the relevant initia-
tives. Or, regulation may produce unanticipated harmful conse-
quences. All of these results may follow from the regulators'
incomplete understanding of the system into which they are at-
tempting to intervene. This is not an argument that government
should never intervene in markets. But it is certainly a reason
for caution, for attempting to acquire a good deal of information,
and for proceeding in an experimental, nondogmatic way.
It is less often recognized that constitutional law can have
similar problems. Supreme Court decisions may be counterpro-
ductive. If it is understood as a case about gender equality, Roe v
Wade' is a possible example since the Court's decision may well
have damaged the effort to produce gender equality.2 Or Su-
preme Court decisions may be futile. Sometimes Fourth Amend-
ment decisions seem to have this feature; it is far from clear that
police officers comply as a matter of course with Supreme Court
pronouncements about Fourth Amendment requirements. Su-
preme Court decisions may also have harmful unanticipated
consequences. This is true, for example, of many efforts in the
area of judge-led social reform.'
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago.
410 US 113 (1973).
2 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 339-41 (University of Chicago Press, 1993); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev 373, 381-83
(1985).
' See Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Brookings Institution,
1977).
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Justice Holmes's work on constitutional law was built largely
on seeing the political process as a kind of market, subject, like
other markets, to forces of supply and demand." As a regulator of
the political market, the Supreme Court may reach decisions that
reflect ignorance of relevant factors. Because they interfere with
the political market, Supreme Court decisions may also disturb
some kind of social equilibrium. It is ironic but true that many
people alert to the problems with government interference with
economic markets are quite sanguine about Supreme Court inter-
ference with political markets.' This was true in the 1920s when
constitutional law assumed center stage in debates over regula-
tion of new and old markets.6 It is true as the twenty-first cen-
tury approaches, as constitutional law takes center stage in de-
bates over new communications markets, prominently including
the Internet.
In some areas, the Supreme Court, firmly aware of its own
limitations and perhaps aware of the marketlike nature of poli-
tics, operates casuistically. It avoids broad rules. It is aware of
underlying complexities of both fact and value. In the area of
affirmative action, this has been the Court's preferred course
The Court has avoided simple rules. Its decisions have been high-
ly case specific. The democratic process has been given a lot of
room to maneuver.
I suggest that this casuistical model makes sense for
cyberspace.' This is so for two reasons. First, underlying values
are in flux and not simple to sort out. There is, for example, a
large debate over the regulation of pornography, especially por-
nography about and for children, on the Internet. There is also a
large debate about the relationships among the Internet, chil-
dren, and parental control.' It is also unclear that the Court's
See Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U Chi L Rev 213 (1964).
See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (Harvard University Press, 1985). See also Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties
and the Constitution (University of Chicago Press, 1980).
6 See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 167 (Little Brown, 2d ed 1991).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Deliberation and the Supreme Court, 84 Cal L Rev
(forthcoming, July 1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, Harv L
Rev (forthcoming, Nov 1996).
' As the Court concluded in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consor-
tium, Inc. v FCC, 116 S Ct 2374 (1996), a decision reached after this essay was initially
written.
See Robert A. Sirico, Don't Censor The Internet, Forbes 48 (July 29, 1996); James
Coates, Firms Can Clean Up By Blocking Web's Smut; Parents First Target of Censoring
Software, Chi Tribune 1, sec 4 (July 29, 1996); Zoe Lofgren, Free For All: Parents Against
Surfing, Wash Post A17 (July 20, 1996) (op/ed piece).
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free speech doctrine-founded on the categories of viewpoint-
based, content-based, and content-neutral regulation-makes
complete sense. If, for example, the government attempts to pro-
mote educational and public-affairs programming, it is acting on
a content-discriminatory basis, but are its actions for that reason
illegitimate?
The problem is not limited to values. On the underlying
facts, things are changing very rapidly, and courts know relative-
ly little; but the facts are crucial to the analysis. The new com-
munications technologies in general are a good example. If cable
television flourishes, will ordinary broadcasters be at risk in a
way that threatens free programming?" Courts are not likely to
be in a good position to answer this question. This was the key
problem in the Turner case,1 and while there is reason to think
that interest-group pressures underlay the relevant statute, pre-
dictive issues are not, in general, well-suited to judicial resolu-
tion. In such circumstances the Court does best if it proceeds
cautiously and with humility, allowing some room for political
judgment and maneuvering in a setting that is in such flux. 2
In the area of cyberspace, there is a related but more general
issue. I believe that the First Amendment is sometimes playing
substantially the same role with respect to the communications
market as did the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the
labor market in the period from 1905 through 1936.13 In that
period, questions about minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws,
or efforts to protect labor unions, were answered in significant
part by asking: What does the Due Process Clause say on such
questions? 4 In retrospect we can see that this was a bad way to
proceed-that it would have been much better to dispense with
lawyers and cases and to focus instead on underlying questions of
fact and value, questions for which purely legal tools are inade-
quate. The problems of policy should be solved by people who
understand problems of policy, not by lawyers skilled in reading
Supreme Court opinions.
See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 512 US 622 (1994), reh'g denied 115
S Ct 30 (1994).
" Id (holding that government may regulate cable operators with must-carry obliga-
tions provided such regulations do not suppress substantially more speech than necessary
to make television broadcast viable).
12 See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743 (1995), suggesting
an approach quite similar to what I am suggesting here. I am indebted to Professor Lessig
for valuable discussion.
" Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 786 (cited in note 6).
14 Id.
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To some extent, the same is true for cyberspace. Too often,
hard questions are answered by consulting previous cases, as if
the First Amendment, judicially understood, supplies the founda-
tions for choosing regulatory policy for the emerging speech mar-
ket. Of course the First Amendment has a good deal to say about
legitimate regulatory strategies. Obviously, some such strategies
would violate the First Amendment. But the relevant questions
are first and foremost ones of policy rather than constitutional
law; courts and judges would do well to remember this point.
II. EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF REGULATION
A. Child Pornography, Obscenity, Parental Control
Consider a few examples. With the touch of a button, it is
now possible to reach millions of people, whether or not they
want to be reached. Libelous statements, commercial messages,
hate speech, child pornography, threats-the cost of sending all
of these to millions is very low. This simple fact may make it
necessary to rethink constitutional categories. There has been
particular concern recently about the free availability of sexually
explicit materials on the Internet, especially in the context of
materials soliciting, involving, or available to children."5 Per-
haps the government should be allowed to regulate not only child
pornography, and not only obscenity, but a somewhat broader
range of materials because of the distinctive interest in protect-
ing children.16 At least the Court's obscenity doctrine bears un-
certainly on this question, and mechanical use of that doctrine
may produce error. It is important to get a sense of the nature of
the underlying problem before reaching confident conclusions. 7
5 The increasing attention being given to pornography on the Internet is evidenced
by the fact that from Spring 1991 to January 24, 1994, Lexis-Nexis listed only 69 articles
on this subject, as contrasted with 3,451 articles on this subject entered from January 24,
1994 to January 24, 1996.
'" See S 314, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 30, 1995) in 141 Cong Rec S 1953 (Feb 1,
1995). Popularly known as the Communications Decency Act of 1995, was introduced by
Senator Jim Exon (D-Neb) in the United States Senate and enacted into law January 31,
1996 as the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133 (1996),
amending 47 USC § 223. Its definition of "harm to children," goes beyond obscenity to
include, for example, materials that contain "indecency or nudity." Id, amending 47 USC
§ 223(a)(1)(A)(ii). This provision extends far beyond current law. Portions of the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996 were declared unconstitutional in ACLU v Reno, 929 F
Supp 824 (ED Pa 1996) and in Shea v Reno, 930 F Supp 916 (SD NY 1996). In my view
these decisions were correct. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
17 A narrow, and in my view correct, decision is Denver Area Educational Telecommu-
nications Consortium, Inc. v FCC, 116 S Ct 2374, 2390 (1996) (upholding a grant of
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Related issues are raised by the use of the Internet to circu-
late libelous, threatening, or sexually violent material about an
identifiable person. It may well be that the easy transmission of
such material to millions of people will justify deference to rea-
sonable legislative judgments.18
Suppose that the government intends to assist parental con-
trol by allowing families to "block" certain material and to pre-
vent it from entering the home. This idea would bear an obvious
resemblance to the controversial "v-chip" proposal that was re-
cently enacted by Congress. 9 Through this enactment, Congress
is requiring new televisions to be equipped with technology en-
abling parents to block certain programming. The requirement
may substantially affect programming because of anticipated
parental blocking; but this by itself is not constitutionally deci-
sive. The existence of such an effect resulting from anticipated
viewer behavior is part of a well-functioning market. Proposals of
this sort would facilitate parental control, but would not involve
federal content regulation; they would not involve direct govern-
mental control or censorship of the speech market."0 Because
they are noncensorial and facilitative, courts should treat them
more leniently.
The only serious questions include selectivity and bias: Is the
government facilitating the exclusion of material of which the
government disapproves? If so, the fact that no direct regulation
is involved is not enough; impermissible selectivity would be
objectionable by itself. Certainly it would be troublesome if the
government enabled people to screen out material of a certain,
governmentally disapproved content; imagine a governmentally
mandated "Democrat chip" or "Gingrich chip" or "liberal chip."
But the "v-chip" is best seen as lacking this feature. It would
discriminate on the basis of content, not on the basis of view-
permission to exclude "indecent" programming),
" But see United States v Baker, 890 F Supp 1375 (1995). In that case, the defen-
dants sent sexually explicit e-mail to one another which contained the graphic description
of the torture, rape, and murder of a classmate of one of the defendants. The government
charged the defendants with transmitting threats to injure or kidnap another. The court
dismissed the charges, finding that the descriptions contained in the e-mail were fiction
and did not constitute a "true threat" under the statute.
Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat at 141-42 amending 47 USC § 223 (cited in note 16).
See Newton N. Minow and Craig L. Lamay, Abandoned in the Wasteland (Hill and Wang,
1994).
0 See Denver Area, 116 S Ct at 2390, which is strong support for the validity of the
v-chip, especially insofar as it upholds § 10(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992, § 10(a), Pub L No 102-385, 106 Stat 1486, codified at 47
USC § 532(h) (1994).
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point. For this reason it should probably be upheld, at least on
an appropriate factual record demonstrating that the government
is attempting to combat harm rather than content or view-
point.2 What I am emphasizing here is that preexisting catego-
ries do not give clear guidance and that it is best for the courts to
proceed in a cautious manner.
B. Violence and the Internet
Let me turn now to a question that has received considerable
public attention and that particularly shows the need for a de-
gree of judicial caution in using the First Amendment: the ques-
tion of violent speech on the Internet." Applying ordinary stan-
dards, constitutional lawyers may well believe that this is a sim-
ple issue, settled by Brandenburg v Ohio.2 But things are more
complex.
The controversy arose last spring when talk-show host G.
Gordon Liddy, speaking on the radio to millions of people, ex-
plained how to shoot agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms: "Head shots, head shots .... Kill the sons of
bitches."24 Later he said, "[s]hoot twice to the belly and if that
does not work, shoot to the groin area."25 On March 23, the full
text of the Terrorist's Handbook was posted on the Internet,
including instructions on how to make a bomb (the same bomb,
as it happens, that was used in Oklahoma City)." By the time
of the Oklahoma bombing on April 19, three more people had
posted bomb-making instructions, which could also be found on
the Internet in the Anarchist's Cookbook.27 On the National Ri-
fle Association's Internet "Bullet 'N' Board," someone calling
himself "Warmaster" explained how to make bombs using baby-
food jars.28 Warmaster wrote, "These simple, powerful bombs
21 Denver Area, 116 S Ct at 2385-87.
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Violent Speech a Right?, American Prospect 34-35 (Sum-
mer 1995).
23 395 US 444, 449 (1969) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendment con-
demn a statute which purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid assembly with
others merely to advocate the described type of action).
24 See James Coates and Mike Doming, On the Internet, Extremists Spread Hate with
Every Keystroke, Chi Tribune 1-14 (Apr 26, 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, What To Do With G.
Gordon Liddy: Is Violent Speech a Right?, Current 21 (Nov 1995).
25 Id.
26 Sunstein, Current at 21 (cited in note 24); Lawless, The Economist S15 (July 1,
1995).
21 Sunstein, Current at 21 (cited in note 24).
' 1d; Guy Gugliotta, NRA, Backers Have Focused in on ATF; Gun Group's Ad Charg-
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are not very well known even though all the materials can be
easily obtained by anyone (including minors)."29 After the Okla-
homa bombing, an anonymous notice was posted to dozens of
Usenet news groups listing all the materials in the Oklahoma
City bomb, explaining why the bomb allegedly did not fully ex-
plode and exploring how to improve future bombs.30
Fifty hate groups are reported to be communicating on the
Internet, sometimes about conspiracies and (by now this will
come as no surprise) formulas for making bombs.3  On
shortwave radio, people talk about bizarre United Nations plots
and urge that "the American people ought to go there bodily, rip
down the United Nations building and kick those bastards right
off our soil.""2 In fact, last year Rush Limbaugh, who does not
advocate violence, said to his audience, "The second violent
American revolution is just about, I got my fingers about a fourth
of an inch apart, is just about that far away. Because these peo-
ple are sick and tired of a bunch of bureaucrats in Washington
driving into town and telling them what they can and can't
do. 33
In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, a national de-
bate has erupted about speech over the Internet counseling vio-
lence or inciting hatred of public officials. 4 Of course it is un-
clear whether such speech has had a causal role in any act of
bombing. But new technologies, and particularly the Internet,
have put the problem of incitement into sharp relief. It is likely,
perhaps inevitable, that hateful and violent messages carried
over the airwaves and the Internet will someday be responsible
es 'Rogue Agency' With Misconduct, Abuse and 'Con tempt for Civil Rights', Wash Post A16
(April 26, 1995). See also Mark Sauer and Jim Okerblom, Patriotism or Paranoia?, San
Diego Union-Tribune El, E4 (May 4, 1995).
Sauer & Okerblom, San Diego Union-Tribune at E4 (cited in note 28).
30 Sunstein, Current at 21 (cited in note 24); See also Steve Marlowe, Cops Get Copies
of Napalm Recipe; Kids Had Formula on Computer Disk, The Record Al (Apr 20, 1995);
Matthew Mosk, Bomb Manual Ready, Waiting, The Record NJ1 (May 5, 1995).
" Joseph P. Shapiro, Extremism in America: An epidemic of fear and loathing, US
News & World Report 37, 39 (May 8, 1995). See also Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Hate
Groups Embrace Cyberspace as Weapon, Chi Tribune 1-1 (Dec 12, 1995).
' All Things Considered: Hate Groups Use Short Wave to Rant, Rave and Recruit,
(National Public Radio, May 4, 1995) (transcript of show 1837, segment 7, on file at the
Legal Forum office).
Robert Wright, Did Newt Do It?, The New Republic 4, 45 (May 15, 1995).
See Eric Lichtblau & Jim Newton, Internet Blamed for Steep Rise in Bomb Reports,
LA Times B1 (June 27, 1996); Debra Gersh Hernandez, Mayhem Online, Editor & Pub-
lisher 34 (June 24, 1995); Charles V. Zehren, The Debate to Limit Cyberhate, Newsday A7
(May 12, 1995); Kelly Owen, Hate Speech on Internet Called Protected by Constitution, LA
Times A17 (May 12, 1995).
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for acts of violence. This is simply a statement of probability. The
questions raised for constitutional lawyers are these: Is that
probability grounds for restricting such speech? Would restric-
tions on speech advocating violence or showing how to engage in
violent acts be acceptable under the First Amendment? And how
do preexisting categories bear on the current issue?
1. The clear and present danger doctrine and its evolution.
It should go without saying that recent events should not be
a pretext for allowing the government to control political dissent,
including extremist speech and legitimate hyperbole (a large and
important category). But the new and unanswered question has
to do with the constitutionality of restrictions on speech that
expressly advocates illegal, murderous violence in messages to
mass audiences. For most of American history, the courts held
that no one has a right to advocate violations of the law."5 They
ruled that advocacy of crime is wholly outside of the First
Amendment-akin to a criminal attempt and punishable as
such. 6 Indeed, many of the judges .revered as the strongest
champions of free speech believed that express advocacy of crime
was punishable. Judge Learned Hand, in his great 1917 opinion
in Masses Publishing Co. v Patten,37 established himself as a
true hero of free speech when he said that even dangerous dissi-
dent speech was generally protected against government regula-
tion. But Hand himself agreed that government could regulate
any speaker who would "counsel or advise a man" to commit an
unlawful act.3"
In the same period the Supreme Court concluded that gov-
ernment could punish all speech, including advocacy of illegality,
that had a "tendency" to produce illegality.39 Justices Holmes
and Brandeis, the dissenters from this conclusion, took a differ-
ent approach, saying that speech could be subjected to regulation
only if it was likely to produce imminent harm;" thus they origi-
" See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 1025 (Little Brown, 2d ed 1991)
(cited in note 6). See also Masses Publishing Co. v Patten, 244 F 535 (SD NY 1917), rev'd,
246 F 24 (2d Cir 1917).
36 Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 1031 (cited in note 6); Masses Publishing, 244 F
at 540.
17 Masses Publishing, 244 F at 539.
Id at 540.
9 See Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 1031 (cited in note 6).
'0 See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis dissenting);
Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes concurring). But see
Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) (overruling Whitney).
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nated the famous "clear and present danger" test.4' But even
Holmes and Brandeis suggested that the government could pun-
ish speakers who had the explicit intention of encouraging
crime.42
For many years thereafter, the Supreme Court tried to dis-
tinguish between speech that was meant as a contribution to
democratic deliberation and speech that was designed to encour-
age illegality. 3 The former was protected; the latter was not. In
1951 the Court concluded in Dennis v United States" that a
danger need not be so "clear and present" if the ultimate harm
was very grave.45 The break in the doctrine did not come until
the Court's 1969 decision in Brandenburg v Ohio." There the
Court said the government could not take action against a mem-
ber of the Ku Klux Klan, who said, among other things, "[W]e're
not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress,
our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengence
taken."47 The speaker did not explicitly advocate illegal acts or
illegal violence. But in its decision, the Court announced a broad
principle, ruling that the right to free speech does "not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action."
48
Offering extraordinarily broad protection to political dissent,
the Court required the government to meet three different crite-
ria to regulate speech.49 First, the speaker must promote not
just any lawless action but "imminent" lawless action.5 ° Second,
the imminent lawless action must be "likely" to occur.5 Third,
the speaker must intend to produce imminent lawless action.52
Abrams, 250 US at 627 (Holmes dissenting); Whitney, 274 US at 373 (Brandeis
concurring).
42 Abrams, 250 US at 627 (Holmes dissenting); Whitney, 274 US at 374 (Brandeis
concurring).
41 Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 1070 (cited in note 6).
341 US 494 (1951).
Id at 510-11.
46 395 US at 444.
47 Id at 446.
41 Id at 447.
49 Id.
' Brandenberg, 395 US at 447.
s' Id.
52 Id (stating that the speech must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action").
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The Brandenburg test borrows something from Hand and some-
thing from Holmes and produces a standard even more protective
of speech than either of theirs.
2. Old standards, new technology.
Applied straightforwardly, the Brandenburg test seems to
protect most speech that can be heard on the airwaves or found
on the Internet. It suggests that there is no need for casuistry
and that a simple rule can resolve all cases. And in general, the
Brandenburg test makes a great deal of sense. Remarks like
those quoted from Rush Limbaugh unquestionably qualify for
protection; such remarks are not likely to incite imminent law-
less action, and in any case they are not "directed to" producing
such action. They should also qualify as legitimate hyperbole, a
category recognized in a 1969 decision allowing a war protester
to say, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to
get in my sights is L. B. J."53 Even Liddy's irresponsible state-
ments might receive protection insofar as they could be viewed as
unlikely to produce imminent illegality. A high degree of protec-
tion and breathing space makes a great deal of sense whenever
the speech at issue is political protest, which lies at the core of
the First Amendment.
But there is some ambiguity in the Brandenburg test, espe-
cially in the context of modern technologies, and it is here that a
high degree of judicial caution is appropriate. Suppose that an
incendiary speech, expressly advocating illegal violence, is not
likely to produce lawlessness in any particular listener or viewer.
But suppose too that it is believed that of the millions of listen-
ers, one or two, or ten, may well be provoked to act, and perhaps
to imminent, illegal violence. Might the government ban advocacy
of criminal violence in mass communications when it is reason-
able to think that one person, or a few, will take action?
Brandenburg offers a reasonable approach to the somewhat
vague speech in question in that case, which was made in a set-
ting where relatively few people were in earshot. But the case
offers unclear guidance on the express advocacy of criminal vio-
lence via the airwaves or the Internet.
When messages advocating murderous violence are sent to
large numbers of people, it is possible to think that the
Brandenburg calculus changes: Government may well have the
authority to stop speakers from expressly advocating the illegal
5- Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 706 (1969).
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use of force, at least if it is designed to kill people. The calculus
changes when the risk of harm increases because of the sheer
number of people exposed. Hence the requirement of causation
might be loosened, at least for explicit advocacy of murder. There
is little democratic value in protecting simple counsels of mur-
der, 4 and the ordinary Brandenburg requirements might be
loosened where the risks are great. Consider, for example, the
fact that Congress has made it a crime to threaten to assassinate
the President, and the Court has cast no doubt on that restriction
of speech.55 It would be a short step, not threatening legitimate
public dissent, for the Federal Communications Commission to
impose civil sanctions on those who expressly advocate illegal
acts aimed at killing people. Courts might well conclude that the
government may use its power over the airwaves to ensure that
this sort of advocacy does not occur.
Of course, there are serious problems in drawing the line
between counsels of violence that should be subject to regulation
and those that should not. We might begin (and perhaps we
should end) with restrictions on express advocacy of unlawful
killing; this is the clearest case. I am not trying to draw conclu-
sions so much as I am trying to suggest reasons for courts to be
cautious in invoking the Constitution. In any case, we can now
see that existing doctrine does not justify a simple conclusion. It
was built on different factual circumstances; it was designed for
what was, with respect to communications, a quite different
world. The degree of danger from counsels of murder has in-
creased with the rise of the Internet.
Authorizing the restriction of any speech, even counsels of
violent crime, creates serious risks. It is unnecessary to empha-
size that government often overreacts to short-term events, and
the 1995 Oklahoma City tragedy, for example, should not be the
occasion for an attack on extremist political dissent. Vigorous,
even hateful, criticism of government is very much at the heart of
the right to free speech. Certainly advocacy of law violation can
' The case might be different, however, if the counsel of violence is made part of an
actual political argument. See Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971) (holding that a state
could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make wearing a
jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" a criminal offense).
5' See Watts, 394 US at 707 (upholding the facial validity of a statute criminalizing
threats of violence directed against the President because of the "overwhelmin[g] interest
in protecting the safety of [the] Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties
without interference from threats of physical violence"). See also R.A. v St. Paul, 505
US 377 (1992) (stating "the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of
violence that are directed against the President").
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be an appropriate part of democratic debate. As the example of
Martin Luther King, Jr. testifies, there is an honorable tradition
of civil disobedience. We should sharply distinguish, however,
King's form of nonviolent civil disobedience from counsels or acts
of murder. The principle condemning government regulation of
political opinions, including the advocacy of illegal acts, need not
be interpreted to bar the government from restricting advocacy of
unlawful killing on the mass media. These are hard cases, and
courts should be reluctant to conclude that the First Amendment
forbids well-designed legislative initiatives.
3. Bombs.
Does the government have the power to limit speech contain-
ing instructions on how to build weapons of mass destruction?
The Brandenburg test was designed mostly to protect unpopular
points of view from government controls; it need not protect the
publication of bomb manuals, at least if these manuals are being
transmitted to millions of people. Instructions for building bombs
are not a point of view, and if government wants to stop the
mass dissemination of this material, it should probably be al-
lowed to do so. A lower court so ruled in a 1979 case involving an
article in The Progressive that described how to make a hydrogen
bomb.56 The court's argument is even stronger as applied to the
speech on the Internet, where so many people can be reached so
easily.5 7 In such a case, the potential harm from the relevant
materials is significantly increased. And bomb manuals, qua
bomb manuals, do not deserve the highest degree of constitution-
56 See United States v Progressive, Inc., 467 F Supp 990 (WD Wis 1979), dismissed by
610 F2d 819 (7th Cir 1979) (unpublished order).
17 It is worth observing here that the nation's leaders can do a good deal short of
regulation. The President and other public officials should exercise their own rights of free
speech to challenge hateful, incendiary speech. Although public officials could abuse these
rights so as to chill legitimate protest, President Clinton's statements condemning hatred
on the radio and on the Internet were entirely on the mark. Public disapproval may
ultimately have a salutary effect (as it recently did in the case of violent television shows),
even without the force of law.
In addition, private institutions, such as broadcasting stations, should think careful-
ly about their own civic responsibilities. An owner of a station or a programming manager
is under no constitutional obligation to air speakers who encourage illegal violence. Sta-
tions that deny airtime for such views do no harm to the First Amendment but on the
contrary exercise their own rights, and in just the right way. In recent months, public and
private concern about hate-mongering has encouraged some stations to cancel G. Gordon
Liddy's show; this is not a threat to free speech but an exercise of civic duties. Similarly,
private online networks, such as Prodigy and America Online, have not only a right but a
moral obligation to discourage speech that expressly counsels illegal killing.
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al protection. Regulation of instructions on how to commit terror-
ist acts does not place the government in a position where it does
not belong.5"
III. QUALIFICATIONS
None of this suggests that the First Amendment has no role
in cyberspace. I suggest that the Court should proceed confident-
ly in three kinds of cases. The first involves those in which the
government is discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. The pro-
hibition on viewpoint discrimination is a natural inference from
the First Amendment's ban on governmental favoritism. If the
government regulates the Internet so as to preclude or prefer
viewpoints of the government's liking, the First Amendment
requires invalidation.
The second category includes cases in which government is
regulating political speech. The heart of the First Amendment
lies in democratic self-governance,59 and when the government
regulates political speech, there is special basis for suspicion. The
only qualification is that courts should probably uphold view-
point-neutral efforts to promote education and greater attention
to public issues."0
Finally, courts should strike down palpably vague or
overbroad statutes."1 Nonpolitical speech may certainly be regu-
50 Progressive, 467 F Supp at 990, however, involved a distinctive issue: an effort to
show how easy it is to learn how to make a bomb.
"9 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (Harp-
er & Row, 1948); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free
Press, 1993).
o See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L J 1757
(1995).
", For key cases on the overbreadth doctrine, see Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518, 519
(1972) (holding a Georgia statute to be on its face unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
in providing that any person using to another "opprobrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," when Geor-
gia courts had held that the statute did not only apply to "fighting words"); Broadrick v
Oklahoma, 413 US 601 (1973) (holding that an Oklahoma statute which prohibited any
employee in the classified service from receiving or soliciting any assessment or contribu-
tion for any political organization or candidacy, did not set out sufficiently explicit stan-
dards, although it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face); City Council
of the City of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789 (1984) (holding that an
ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on public property was not unconstitutional as
applied to expressive activities of a group of supporters of a political candidate); Board of
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 US 569 (1987)
(holding that a regulation banning all 'First Amendment activities" within the airport's
"Central Terminal Area" was facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine be-
cause no conceivable governmental interest could justify this absolute prohibition of
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lated in a constitutionally unacceptable manner. Statutes that
produce guessing games for regulated parties create an unaccept-
able risk. Congress should be expected to regulate with at least a
reasonable degree of clarity.62 Thus lower courts were correct to
invalidate a vague and broad statute banning "indecent" speech
on the Internet. 3
CONCLUSION
When values and institutions are in flux, it is appropriate for
the Court to proceed casuistically and to avoid broad rulings. The
constitutional issues raised by cyberspace will turn on issues that
cannot be fully resolved in 1995, 1996, or even 1999. In some
ways, the First Amendment is, with respect to modern communi-
cations markets, playing the same pernicious role as did the Due
Process Clause in the early part of the twentieth century with
respect to labor markets. Hard issues of value and fact-issues of
policy in which policy analysts should play a large role-are
displaced by reference to constitutional categories, some of them
quite arcane, and some of them likely to be ill-suited to a good
understanding of the underlying phenomena. In a period of rapid
change and technological uncertainty, in which those schooled in
law are likely to be ignorant, there is much room for tentative,
speech); Brockett v Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 US 491 (1985) (deferring to Court of
Appeal's conclusion that a Washington statute which included "lust" within its definition
of "prurient" was unconstitutionally overbroad, but reversing the decision on the ground
that the lower court should have partially invalidated the statute as to the portion includ-
ing "lust" rather than entirely invalidating it). But see New York v Ferber, 458 US 747
(1982) (holding that a child pornography statute which prohibited "lewd exhibition of the
genitals" was not overbroad).
For key cases on the vagueness doctrine, see Connally v General Construction Co.,
269 US 385, 391 (1926) (holding that a law is facially void if it is vague enough that
people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application"); Grayned v Rockford, 408 US 104 (1972) (stating that it is a basic principle
that a law which fails to clearly define the conduct it proscribes is unconstitutional);
Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 361 (1983) (holding that an antiloitering statute requir-
ing people to carry identification" and to account for their presence if questioned by a
police officer was unconstitutionally vague because the. law reached "a substantial amount
of [protected First Amendment] conduct").
6 An example of a law that could (and should) be held to be overbroad is the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996. Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133 (1996), amending 47
USC § 223 (cited in note 16). This Act makes all telecommunications providers doing
business in the United States potentially liable for the content of anything sent over their
networks including "indecent" or "filthy" speech. Id, amending 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(cited in note 16):
' Shea v Reno, 930 F Supp 916 (SD NY 1996) (holding that portions of the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996 were unconstitutionally overbroad); ACLU v Reno, 929 F
Supp 824 (ED Pa 1996) (holding the same portions of the Act unconstitutional).
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narrow judgments. In cyberspace, constitutional lawyers should
be (at least relatively) cautious.

